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Abstract 
The Green Paper on Audit Policy by the European Commission has raised serious concerns 
about the independence of external auditors and it has explicitly encouraged additional 
research about the implications of long tenures with the audit firm. We address the effects of 
audit firm tenure on independence, measuring independence by the opinion of the audit 
report. We perform this analysis with a sample of Spanish public companies for the period 
2002-2009. Prior research has mostly limited to examine the issuance of going-concern 
modified opinions with samples of financially distressed firms. This approach would present 
some limitations in terms of the generalization of the results as well as regarding the ability 
to address the traditional role of the auditor in the classical corporate governance scheme. 
To overcome these shortcomings, we propose a multinomial approach which allows, on the 
one hand, the inclusion of all types of audit qualifications in the analysis; while, on the other 
hand, it takes into account the particularly serious implications of going-concern opinions for 
the auditor-client relationship. Our results show that auditors seem willing to sacrifice 
independence in lengthy engagements, but only regarding non-going-concern modified 
opinions. This finding is robust to the inclusion of various proxies of accounting quality in the 
analysis.  
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1. Introduction 
Auditing plays a major role in the classical approach to corporate governance, as it 
provides an external, and supposedly independent, certification to the accounting information 
prepared by managers. However, auditors face a conflict of interests that might undermine 
credibility and, as a result, could deteriorate investors’ confidence. In the early sixties, Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961) pointed out that extended auditor-client relationships could reduce 
auditor’s objectivity and thus impair independence. Since them, lengthy auditor-client 
relationships have been considered a major issue in the auditor’s conflict of interest. Hence, 
long-term relationships might cause auditor complacency about and possibly complicity in 
the decisions that management makes regarding the presentation of financial statements 
(e.g., Shockley, 1982; Myers et al., 2003). The potentially negative effects of long tenures 
on independence is also acknowledged by the IFAC Code of Ethics which states that a 
‘familiarity threat occurs when, by virtue of a close relationship with an assurance client, its 
directors, officers or employees, a firm or a member of the assurance team becomes too 
sympathetic to the client’s interests’ (IFAC Code of Ethics ED 2003, p. 18).  
As a result of these concerns, the mandatory rotation of external auditors has often 
been suggested as a way of strengthening independence. Hence, even though the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) did not impose the mandatory rotation of the audit firm, it required a study 
by the Comptroller General of the United States (GAO, 2003), about the potential effects of 
imposing the mandatory rotation of auditors. The study did not show a negative effect of 
lengthy engagements on the quality of financial reports, and thus, it did not recommend 
rotation. However, the regulator finally established the mandatory rotation of the lead audit 
partner, which could not provide audit services for the same client for more than five 
consecutive fiscal years. It also established a minimum five-year time-out period before a 
partner could re-audit a client. Many countries have adopted similar rotation rules. For 
example, by the year 2008, the 27 States Members of the European Union (E.U.) were 
required to adapt national law systems to the revised 8th Company Law Directive 
(hereinafter, the revised 8thDirective). A main feature of this Directive was to enforce audit 
rotation at the partner level, although each State Member could voluntarily establish the 
maximum length of the auditor-client relationship. At present, several maximum periods 
coexist within the E.U., for example, five years in the United Kingdom, six years in France or 
seven years in Germany and Spain.1 Nevertheless, only four years after the approval of the 
revised 8th Directive, the European Commission (EC) explicitly questioned the sufficiency of 
the current regulatory framework to adequately guarantee independence. In its first 
paragraph, the Green Paper on Audit Policy states: ‘‘(…) limited attention has been given so 
far to how the audit function could be enhanced in order to contribute to increase financial 
stability. (…) It seems thus appropriate that both the role of the audit as well as the scope of 
audit are further discussed and scrutinised in the general context of financial market 
regulatory reform.’’ According to the Paper, one of the major threats to the real 
independence of external auditors is that mandatory rotation has been established only at a 
partner level: ‘‘Situations where a company has appointed the same audit firm for decades 
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seem incompatible with desirable standards of independence. Even when "key audit 
partners" are regularly rotated as currently mandated by the Directive, the threat of 
familiarity persists. In this context, the mandatory rotation of audit firms – not just of audit 
partners – should be considered.’’ (EC 2010: 11). Similarly, in 2011 the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued a concept release about mandatory audit firm 
rotation and initiated the process of examining its merits and drawbacks (PCAOB, 2011). The 
main concern, as expressed by PCAOB Chairman Mr. Doty, was about auditors’ lack of 
professional skepticism.2 The PCAOB is currently considering whether lengthy audit firm 
tenures align auditors’ interests with management instead of protecting investors. 
 Following this interest, numerous studies have addressed the effect of audit tenure 
on various proxies of audit quality, like for instance, audit failures, the auditor’s propensity to 
issue qualified reports, the frequency of restatements or several indicators of earnings 
quality. While all these variables would constitute suitable measures of audit quality, those 
researchers specifically interested in the independence dimension of audit quality have used 
the opinion of the audit report. Hence, in this paper we address the effects of audit firm 
tenure on independence, measuring independence by the opinion of the audit report. We 
perform this analysis with a sample of Spanish public companies for the period 2002-2009.  
The main motivation of this study relies on the current regulatory discussion on the 
convenience of a mandatory audit firm rotation rule. In this line, the EC (2010) Green Paper 
has explicitly encouraged additional investigation on auditor independence within the 
European Union. Moreover, empirical research is not only inconclusive but mainly refers to 
the U.S. Since litigation risk plays a major role as a determinant of the auditor reporting 
decision (e.g., Melumad and Thoman, 1990; Narayanan, 1994), the relatively high-litigation 
risk of the U.S. would make it difficult to extrapolate the reported results to other settings.3 
In addition, those studies using the opinion of the audit report as the measure of 
independence have generally limited to the analysis of the issuance of going-concern 
modified opinions (GCMOs) to financially distressed firms. This approach might present, at 
least, two shortcomings, a lack of generalization problem on the one hand and the inability 
to account for the main role of the auditor, as information verifiers, in the classical corporate 
governance scheme (Simunic, 1984), on the other hand. Moreover, the scarce research 
addressing all types of firms and audit qualifications has failed to account for the potentially 
different implications of GCMOs and non-going-concern modified opinions (NGCMOs).  
The aim of this article is to contribute to the literature on auditor independence by 
providing a new framework which might overcome the abovementioned shortcomings. 
Hence, the multinomial logistic approach we propose allows the inclusion of all types of 
qualification into the analysis, but at the same time, it acknowledges the potentially different 
implications of different types of audit qualifications. It should also be noted that unlike 
previous research examining the tenure-audit qualifications relationship, accounting quality is 
included in the model as a determinant of audit qualifications. We consider this an important 
issue, because without including accounting quality in the analysis, any reported negative 
effect of tenure on audit qualifications (as for example in Vanstraelen, 2000) could mean 
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either loss of independence with tenure, or conversely higher accounting quality (and thus, 
lower likelihood of audit qualifications). Evidently, the regulatory implications of each 
situation would be opposite. Finally, the institutional framework of this research would 
enhance the relevance of the reported results. Firstly, because the Spanish audit market is 
characterized by unusually lengthy audit firm tenures, and thus the potentially negative 
implications of long tenures on independence can be better addressed, compared with most 
prior research; and secondly, because for the first time the analysis of the effects of audit 
firm tenure is performed in a context of mandatory partner rotation. This feature strengthen 
the usefulness of the results for regulators and policy makers, as if a firm rotation rule were 
established, it would likely be done by maintaining the mandatory rotation of the lead audit 
partner.  
Our results show that long tenures would make NGCMOs less likely but would not 
affect GCMOs. Moreover, the lower likelihood of NGCMOs in lengthy audit engagements 
cannot be explained by a supposedly higher accounting quality in these engagements. This 
finding highlights the limitations of the general approach followed in the literature to capture 
the loss of independence only through the issuance of GCMOs to financially distressed firms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, we review the 
literature on the association between tenure and audit quality, with a main interest in those 
papers addressing the tenure-audit qualifications relationship. Section three summarizes the 
regulation of the auditor-client relationship in the Spanish market. In section four we define 
our model and describe our dataset. Results are discussed in section five. Finally, in the last 
section the conclusions and implications of our findings are drawn. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
The opinion of the audit report constitutes the usual proxy for auditor independence 
and therefore an indicator of audit quality. The rationale of this approach would be that as 
the probability of switching the audit firm increases after a qualified report (e.g., Krishnan, 
1994; Lennox, 2000), qualified opinions would denote an exercise of independence by the 
external auditor. Following the concern about the negative effects of long tenures on 
independence, we should expect a lower likelihood of qualified reports in lengthy auditor-
client relationships. However, empirical research, particularly prolific over the last two 
decades, has mostly refused that independence would be threatened by long tenures. Hence, 
neither Louwers (1998) nor Carcello and Neal (2000) found a negative effect of tenure on 
the likelihood of going-concern opinions in their studies performed with samples of U.S. 
financially distressed firms. A similar conclusion was reached by Vanstraelen (2002) and 
Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) for the Belgian market, and by Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2004) 
and (2006) for Spain. However, more recent research has provided somewhat contradictory 
results. Hence, while Lim and Tan (2010) reported a positive effect of tenure on audit 
quality, Gul et al. (2011) for the U.S. and Firth et al. (2012) for China, concluded that 
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auditors were willing to forgo their independence by issuing fewer GCMOs when auditor 
tenure were long. Without limiting the analysis to financially distressed companies or GCMOs, 
Vanstraelen (2000) concluded that long-term auditor-client relationships significantly 
increased the likelihood of unqualified audit reports in the Belgian market.  
With the exception of Vanstraelen (2000), the effects of tenure on the likelihood of 
qualified reports have been studied in the context of GCMOs and financially distressed firms. 
Such approach would face serious shortcomings regarding the generalization of the reported 
results either to the whole population of firms or to the whole universe of audit qualifications. 
Financially distressed firms are not representative of the whole population of audited firms 
and the same holds for GCMOs regarding the whole universe of audit qualifications. On the 
other hand, results reported by Vanstraelen (2000), although more generalizable because of 
the inclusion of all type of audit qualifications and firms in the analysis, do not differentiate 
between GCMOs and NCCMOs. In our view, this distinction is meaningful as, on the one 
hand, both categories represent different dimensions of the audit activity and, on the other 
hand, GCMOs would involve particularly serious implications. Regarding the first issue, 
Simunic (1984) posed that the auditors’ traditional role in the corporate governance scheme 
is to verify the information produced by managers. However, when auditors issue a qualified 
report for reasons of going concern, they are not performing this information verifier role, 
but acting as a substitute of bankruptcy prediction models.4 Regarding the particularly 
serious implications of GCMOs, the decision of issuing a qualified opinion is influenced by the 
perceived consequences in the economic trade-off between the expected cost of the potential 
loss of a client, on the one hand, and the probability of being exposed to third-party lawsuits 
and loss of reputation, on the other. The risk of litigation faced by the audit firm would be 
particularly high when it fails to issue a GCMO to a company that subsequently goes 
bankrupt (e.g., Palmrose 1987; Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; 
Francis, 2004). Therefore, Vanstraelen’s (2000) approach would fail to account for the 
potentially different implications of GCMOs and NGCMOs. If, as our results indicate, auditors 
are willing to forego independence regarding NGCMOs but not regarding comparatively 
riskier GCMOs, the inclusion of the two types of audit qualifications into a single variable, 
could cause misleading results.5  
According to the aim of this study, we have reviewed those papers addressing the 
tenure-qualification relationship. However, there is abundant evidence examining the effects 
of tenure on other dimensions of audit quality, as restatements (e.g., Myers et al., 2005; 
Stanley and DeZoort, 2007), audit failures (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002), earnings 
quality (e.g., Myers et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2002; Davis et al., 2009) and investor 
perceptions of earnings quality (Ghosh and Moon, 2005). These studies generally support a 
positive or neutral effect of tenure on audit quality. 
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3. Audit regulation in Spain 
With the main goals of enhancing transparency and the comparability of financial 
statements across countries, the Ley de Auditoría de Cuentas (Audit Law) was enforced in 
1988 in Spain as a result of the implementation of the 8th Directive on Company Law.6 The 
Audit Law established a multi-year contract with the audit firm with duration between three 
and nine years and, in order to strengthen independence, the mandatory rotation of the 
audit firm at the end of the initial contract. Nevertheless, as a result of a subsequent legal 
reform, both the maximum limit in the number of consecutive years to be audited by the 
same firm and the prohibition to reappoint the audit firm were abolished in 1995.7 Following 
this reform, auditors could be engaged for an initial period of between three nine years and, 
after the expiration of the initial contract, a tacit year by year renewal of the contract was 
established.  
With the same aim as the SOX in the U.S., the Ley de Medidas para la Reforma del 
Sistema Financiero (Measures for Reforming the Financial System Act) commonly known as 
Ley Financiera (Financial Law) was passed in 2002 as a reaction to corporate financial 
scandals at the end of the past century. During the Law’s approval process it was included an 
amendment imposing the mandatory rotation of the audit firm after a maximum period of 
twelve years. Besides, a minimum three-year period was required to re-hire the audit firm. 
Similarly to the 1995 reform revoking mandatory rotation, largely the result of pressures 
induced by audit firms, this amendment led to strong criticism from the auditing profession, 
which caused its eventual withdrawal. Finally, mandatory rotation was limited to change the 
audit team after seven years, but not the audit firm. The maximum seven years of tenure for 
the lead partner has also been maintained by the 2010 reform of the Spanish Audit Law, 
however, without imposing the rotation of the whole audit team. The reform also changed 
the tacit year by year renewal of the contract for tacit reappointments for periods of three 
years. Thus, our research period (2002-2009) is characterized by voluntary audit firm 
rotation, mandatory partner rotation and tacit year by year reappointments of the audit firm.  
According to the Spanish legislation, the audit report has to include the opinion of the 
auditor about the firm’s accounting reports. This opinion can be: unqualified, qualified, 
unfavorable or disclaimer of opinion. Nevertheless, audit reports with unfavorable or 
disclaimer of opinion are very rare in Spain, at least for quoted companies. The supervisor of 
the Spanish stock market, Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), classifies audit 
qualifications into two major groups: quantified and unquantified. In addition, quantified 
qualifications8 are subsequently classified into two subgroups, depending on whether they 
affect the profit and losses statement or equity. Similarly, unquantified qualifications are also 
classified in ‘uncertainty and others’ and ‘limitations’ (CNMV, 2009). Among qualifications 
due to uncertainties, the most serious would be those concerning the continuation of 
business, the so-called GCMOs. However, uncertainties can also have much less dramatic 
effects; for example, they might be associated with the firm’s ability to recover some tax 
credits. On the other hand, qualifications for limitations on scope would show that the auditor 
has not had enough information to apply the procedures required by technical auditing 
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standards. Therefore, while GCMOs are issued when the auditor has doubts about the future 
of the company and thus have little to do with the firm’s financial statements, NGCMOs are 
issued when from the auditor’s point of view, the client’s financial statements do not 
adequately represent the current situation of the firm. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1. Model and hypotheses development 
 This research addresses the effects of tenure on auditors’ independence, measuring 
independence through the opinion of the audit report. The approach we propose extends 
prior research since it allows, on the one hand, to include all types of audit qualifications in 
the analysis while, on the other hand, to account for the particularly serious implications of 
GCMOs for the auditor’s client and thus, for the auditor-client relationship.  
 As discussed in section two, prior studies have generally measured auditor 
independence through the issuance of GCMOs to financially distressed companies. The 
election of GCMOs as a proxy for independence is generally justified on the grounds that 
available evidence (e.g., Chow and Rice, 1982 and Krishnan, 1994 for the U.S.; Craswell, 
1988 for Australia) would show a higher probability of switching audit firms following the 
issuance of a qualified opinion. Similarly, Ball et al. (1979) argued that auditors are reluctant 
to qualify their reports, since it would adversely affect the interests of corporate participants, 
and Levinthal and Fichman (1988) claimed that a qualified opinion is an indicator of conflict 
within the auditor-client relationship. Besides, audit qualifications have negative effects for 
the audited company in terms of negative stock price reactions (Chow and Rice, 1982b; 
Dopuch et al., 1987; Loudder et al., 1992; and Ameen et al., 1994), lower market responses 
to earnings announcements (Choi and Jeter, 1992) and higher costs of debt (Chen et al., 
2012). However, all the above mentioned articles do not limit the analysis to GCMOs, but 
include all types of audit qualifications. Therefore, empirical evidence would support the use 
of audit qualifications (not only GCMOs) as a proxy for independence. This view was also 
implicitly supported by Vanstraelen (2000) and Firth et al. (2012), as they studied all types 
of audit qualifications. However, given the particularly serious consequences of GCMOs for 
the auditor’s client, in our view, GCMOs and NGCMOs should not be included as a single 
category of a bivariate dependent variable. The results by Krishnan (1994), showing that 
auditor switching significantly increases after GCMOs and NGCMOs, but the switching rate is 
almost double for GCMOs than for NGCMOs would support our view. 
Accordingly, the research question states: 
Does auditor independence, measured by the propensity to issue qualified reports, 
decrease with tenure? 
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 Based on the results reported by Vanstraelen (2000) in a low litigation risk country, 9 
and considering the relatively low litigation risk profile of the Spanish audit market, we 
expect a lower likelihood of NGCMOs in longer tenures.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): ceteris paribus, longer auditor-client relationships will make audit 
reports with NGCMOs less likely.  
However, if H1 is not rejected, it could mean either that independence is impaired in 
lengthy auditor-client relationships or, alternatively, that the lower likelihood of audit 
qualifications in longer tenures would be the consequence of higher accounting quality 
achieved in lengthy engagements. Clearly, the implications of both situations for regulators 
and policy makers would be opposed. Based on the serious concern recently expressed by 
the Green Paper on Audit Policy about the negative effects of long tenures on independence, 
if H1 cannot be rejected, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): the lower likelihood of NGCMOs in longer tenures is not 
explained by higher accounting quality achieved in lengthy engagements with the 
audit firm. 
As we discussed in the review of the literature section, the relatively abundant 
research measuring auditor independence through the issuance of audit reports with GCMOs, 
has generally supported a positive (or neutral) effect of tenure on the likelihood of GCMOs. 
This is also the case for the Belgian low litigation risk audit market (Vanstraelen, 2002 and 
Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007). Therefore, based on prior research and, particularly, on the 
available evidence for Spain (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004 and 2006), we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): ceteris paribus, the likelihood of audit reports with GCMOs does 
not depend on the tenure with the audit firm.  
 Prior research on the effects of tenure on the likelihood of audit qualifications has 
been carried out through the classical logistic regression approach, with a dependent binary 
variable coded 0 in case of an unqualified audit report and 1 in case of an ‘unclean’ report. 
While most papers only account for GCMOs, when this is not the case, all types of audit 
qualification are coded 1, independently of their nature. In such cases, the potentially 
different implications of the two types of audit qualifications would not be properly 
addressed. To overcome this limitation we propose a multinomial logistic approach, with a 
dependent variable coded 0 in case of an unqualified report; coded 1 in case of NGCMOs; 
and coded 2 in case of GCMOs.10 Following prior research, the experimental variable in our 
model is the tenure with the audit firm, while control variables are similar to those first used 
by DeFond et al. (2002) and later by Carey and Simnett (2006) to estimate the issuance of 
GCMOs, and basically comprise indicators of financial health. In addition, we also include an 
independent variable accounting for periods of economic downturns as a determinant of the 
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auditor’s reporting decision, as the likelihood of qualified opinions should be higher during 
these periods.  
A major issue in this research is the use of financial ratios, traditionally used as 
determinants of GCMOs, also to explain the issuance of NGCMOs. We base our decision on 
three points. Firstly, following DeFond et al. (2002), the use of financial ratios as control 
variables would be justified because litigation risk constitutes a major motivation for the 
auditor’s reporting decision. Accordingly, high levels of litigation risk would make GCMOs 
more likely. However, litigation risk also increases when the auditor fails to issue NGCMOs to 
companies that goes bankrupt and whose financial statements did not represent its real 
situation. Therefore, financial ratios should contribute to explain not only GCMOs but all 
types of audit qualifications. Secondly, as firms with solvency problems are also expected to 
be more willing to manipulate financial statements (Butler et al., 2004), situations of 
financial distress should make NGCMOs more likely. Finally, many articles, (e.g., Gul et al., 
1992; Laitinen and Laitinen, 1998; Vanstraelen,2000; Hudaib and Cooke, 2005; Meyer et al., 
2007; and Firth et al., 2012) have studied the issuance of audit qualifications, in most cases 
without differentiating between GCMOs and NGCMOs.11 These studies have used the same 
control variables (usually financial ratios) to explain the issuance of qualified reports and, as 
NGCMOs generally represent about 90% of the total number of qualified opinions, they are in 
fact using financial ratios to explain NCMOs. 
Accordingly, we propose the following model to perform the multinomial analysis. 
OPINION = f (PBANK, SIZE, AGE, LEVERAGE, CHLEVERAGE LIQUIDITY, 
 STOCKS, LOSSES, AUDFIRM, CRISIS, DISACC, TENURE) (1) 
 
where: 
Dependent variable: 
OPINION is the variable accounting for the auditor’s opinion: unqualified (coded 0), NGCMO 
(coded 1), and GCMO (coded 2). 
 
Experimental variable: 
TENURE is the number of consecutive years the company has been audited by the same firm.  
 
Control variables: 
PBANK is the probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijewski (1984) score, 
with the weights proposed by Carcello et al. (1995); 
SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s total assets in book values at the end of the year;  
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AGE is natural log of the number of years a company has been listed in the Spanish stock 
market; 
LEVERAGE is the firm’s level of financial leverage calculated as total debt divided by total 
assets, both in book values, at the end of the year; 
CHLEVERAGE is change in LEVEVERAGE during the year; 
LIQUIDITY is the sum of the firm’s cash positions divided between current liabilities; 
STOCKS are computed as the firm’s inventories divided by total assets, both in book values; 
LOSSES is a binary variable with score 1 if the company’s net profit in year t-1 is negative 
and 0 otherwise;  
AUDFIRM is a binary variable with score 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 
0 otherwise; 
CRISIS is a binary variable with score 1 for years 2002, 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. 
The year 2002 corresponds to the dotcom crisis and 2008 and 2009 to the beginning of the 
financial crisis; 
DISACC is a measure of discretionary accruals, in absolute values, as defined by DeFond and 
Park (2001) and later used by Carey and Simnett (2006).12 
 Next, we discuss the expected effects of control variables on the probability of 
‘unclean’ audit reports.  
 PBANK measures the probability of bankruptcy, where higher values indicate a 
greater probability of bankruptcy, and therefore higher litigation risk for the incumbent 
auditor. Thus, we expect a positive effect of PBANK on the likelihood of GCMOs and NGCMOs. 
As previous research (e.g., Lys and Watts, 1994; Shu, 2000) has documented a positive 
relationship between the size of the client and litigation costs, the likelihood of qualified 
reports should be higher for large firms. However, according to DeAngelo (1981) the 
auditors’ incentives to compromise independence would depend on the importance of the 
client. Moreover, large clients would have more negotiating power to avoid audit 
qualifications. As the risk of litigation is relatively low in the Spanish audit market, we predict 
a negative effect of SIZE on the probability of qualified reports.13 AGE would capture the fact 
that financial distress is more likely for younger companies, and thus we predict a negative 
effect of AGE on both types of audit qualifications.14 Financial leverage would make 
bankruptcy more likely and consequently would raise litigation risk. Accordingly, we expect a 
positive effect of LEVERAGE and CHLEVERAGE on GCMOs and NGCMOs. The lack of liquidity 
is usually considered a significant determinant of bankruptcy prediction (e.g., Hopwood et 
al., 1989). Therefore, poor liquidity should increase the likelihood of qualified reports since it 
increases auditor’s litigation risk. In addition, firms with liquidity problems might be more 
willing to manipulate financial statements (e.g., Butler et al., 2004), thus making NGCMOs 
more likely. Therefore, we predict a negative effect of LIQUIDITY on GCMOs and NGCMOs. 
The auditing of the company's inventories might represent serious difficulties, because it 
involves two audit assertions, valuation and completeness (McDaniels, 1990). This would 
explain the higher audit fees for those firms with relatively large amounts of inventories 
(Simunic, 1980). In addition, audit errors (Firth, 2002) and lawsuits against auditors (St. 
Pierre and Anderson, 1984) are also often caused by inventories. Accordingly, we 
 11 
 
hypothesize a positive effect of STOCKS on the probability of NGCMOs. Following previous 
research (e.g., Dopuch et al., 1987; Firth, 2002) companies suffering losses would face 
higher probabilities of having qualified reports. The explanation would be similar to the one 
proposed to justify the expected negative relationship between liquidity and audit 
qualifications. Within the litigation risk framework, as auditors’ litigation risk is higher when 
auditing firms with losses, so it should be the probability of audit qualifications. In addition, 
firms experiencing losses would more likely incur in earnings management activities, 
therefore making NGCMOs more likely. Thus, we predict a positive effect of LOSSES on 
GCMOs and NGCMOs. We introduced AUDFIRM in the model to account for a potentially 
higher propensity to issue qualified reports by big 4 auditors. Thus, we expect an associated 
coefficient with a positive sign regarding GCMOs and NGCMOs. As the risk of bankruptcy is 
higher during periods of economic downturns, we predict a positive effect of CRISIS on 
GCMOs and NGCMOs. However, as GCMOs are directly related to the survival of the 
company, we expect a stronger effect of CRISIS on the model with GCMOs compared to the 
model with NGCMOs. Finally, audit qualifications, particularly NGCMOs, should be more likely 
for those companies showing higher levels of discretionary accruals and, consequently, lower 
accounting quality. Thus, we predict a positive coefficient for DISACC regarding GCMOs and 
NGCMOs.  
 
4.2. Sample and dataset 
 The empirical analysis is performed on the basis of all companies quoted in the 
Spanish Stock Exchange (Sistema de Interconexión Bursátil Español) during the research 
period 2002-2009. The year 2002 is the first year of study because in this year the Financial 
Law was passed, establishing, among other issues, the mandatory rotation of the audit 
partner. Thus, our research period is characterized by homogeneous regulation of firm and 
partner rotation. We obtained the tenure with the audit firm from corporate governance 
reports and the opinion of the audit report from the CNMV. Data about the independent 
variables in the model are provided by Thomson Reuters Knowledge. Since our model 
includes liquidity and debt ratios among control variables, as usual in the literature, banks 
and financial companies have been removed from the sample. Our sample was initially 
formed by 112 companies. Similarly to prior research, we only include in the analysis those 
firms quoted in the Spanish Stock Exchange during the whole research period. Following this 
condition, our sample is finally formed by 83 companies and, given the eight-year research 
period, by 664 firm-year observations. However, we remove 12 cases because of lack of 
information about at least one variable in the model, thus making a final sample of 652 firm-
year observations. In 544 cases the audit report is unqualified, 87 cases shows NGCMOs and 
the remaining 21 cases have GCMOs.  
 Table 1 shows the 652 audit reports classified by year and type of opinion, in 
percentage of total reports of each year. The percentage of unqualified reports steadily 
increases during the subperiod 2002-2006, but decreases afterwards as a result of the 
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international financial crisis. The maximum value corresponds to year 2006, when 90% of 
the total reports were unqualified. Since GCMOs were very rare before the starting of the 
financial crisis, the rise of unqualified reports in the 2002-2006 subperiod is caused by a fall 
in the number of NGCMOs. However, during the 2007-2009 subperiod GCMOs show a 
dramatic increase. 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
 Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics about independent variables. Hence, the 
average company SIZE is 6.73, corresponding to total assets of about five billion of euros. 
The statistics for LEVERAGE would indicate that, on average, the amount of debt represents 
the 63 percent of total assets. Firms’ cash positions represent 16 percent of current 
liabilities, while inventories account for 15 percent of firms’ total assets. The mean value of 
0.12 for LOSSES indicates that companies with negative net income represent 12 percent of 
the sample. The table also shows the extreme level of concentration of the Spanish audit 
market by Big 4 firms, as they have issued 92 percent of the audit reports in the sample. 
Regarding our main variable of interest, TENURE, auditor-client relationships show an 
average duration of almost 10 years, with a maximum value of 23 years. As we discussed in 
the introductory section, the particularly long audit firm tenures in Spain15 constitutes an 
important advantage to address the implications of long tenures on independence.  
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
 Graph 1 shows the histogram of the number of consecutive years that companies in 
the sample have been audited by the same audit firm. As can be seen, the distribution is far 
from normal, since it shows a relatively high concentration of firms in the two extremes of 
the variable.  
INSERT GRAPH1 AROUND HERE 
 
 Table 3 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients and significance levels between pairs 
of independent variables. As can be seen, correlation levels are rather low, with a maximum 
value of 0.54 between PBANK and LEVERAGE. Thus, we do not expect serious 
multicollinearity in the data. The correlation matrix shows the predictable correlation pattern 
of PBANK with LEVERAGE, CHLEVERAGE, LIQUIDITY and LOSSES. There are, however, some 
other more interesting results. Hence, companies audited by Big 4 firms are relatively larger, 
more profitable (LOSSES) and show longer tenures with the audit firm. Focusing on TENURE, 
the correlation pattern would indicate that large, profitable and well-established companies 
(AGE) tend to show longer audit tenures. It is also interesting the negative correlation 
between TENURE and DISACC, indicating that those companies with longer tenures would 
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show lower levels of discretionary accruals, and thus higher accounting quality, although the 
coefficient of correlation is statistically significant only at marginal levels.  
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
5. Results 
In this section, firstly, we present and discuss the results of the univariate analysis 
and afterwards we undertake the multivariate analysis. 
 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
 As a preliminary study, before the estimation of the multinomial logistic model we 
perform a univariate analysis of differences of means for the three groups of firms according 
to the nature of the audit report: unqualified; NGCMOs and GCMOs. Since the Shapiro-Wilk 
test rejects the hypothesis of normality for each independent variable, we use the Mann-
Whitney test of differences of medians to perform the analysis of statistical significance. 
Hence, in table 4 we show the median values of independent variables across subsamples as 
well as significance levels from the Mann-Whitney test for the continuous variables and the 
Pearson chi-square test for the dichotomous variables, LOSSES, AUDFIRM and CRISIS. 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
 
 Results from table 4 strongly fit our expectations. Focusing on TENURE, firms with 
qualified reports (either GCMOs or NGCMOs) would show shorter audit tenures compared to 
firms with unqualified reports. These differences are statistically significant at one percent 
(NGCMOs) and 10 percent (GCMOs) levels.16 We also observe significantly higher 
discretionary accruals associated to NGCMOs and GCMOs, although as it was the case with 
TENURE, in the latter case these differences are only marginally significant. The negative 
correlation between TENURE and DISACC shown by table 3, jointly with the lower levels of 
discretionary accruals for those firms with unqualified audit reports could explain the longer 
median tenures for firms with unqualified reports as a consequence of higher accounting 
quality achieved in longer tenures. Results also indicate that NGCMOs and GCMOs are 
significantly associated to PBANK and LOSSES. In addition, NGCMOs are also significantly 
related to SIZE and LIQUIDITY, while GCMOs are also associated to AGE, LEVERAGE, 
CHLEVERAGE, AUDFIRM, and CRISIS. It should be noted that, with the only exception of AGE 
regarding GCMOs, in all cases these differences in mean and median values always have the 
expected sign. Finally, STOCKS is the only variable showing no significant differences for 
either NGCMOs or GCMOs. 
 14 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
We address the joint effect of tenure and the proposed control variables on the 
likelihood of audit qualifications through a multinomial logistic regression. As expected, 
because of the nature of some independent variables, we find significant heteroscedasticity 
in the data, and thus reported z-values are calculated with robust standard errors. Table 5 
shows estimations for NGCMOs and GCMOs, being firms with unqualified reports the 
comparison group.  
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
 
According to the likelihood ratio chi-square test, the null hypothesis that all 
predictors' regression coefficients in the model are simultaneously zero is rejected. The 
model shows a McFadden's pseudo R2 of 25%. A main issue in multinomial logistic models is 
whether some categories of the dependent variable could be combined into a single one. To 
address this issue, we perform a log-likelihood ratio test for combining dependent categories. 
Our main interest is whether the two categories of audit qualifications, GCMOs and NGCMOs, 
could be combined into a single category. The results of the test indicate that in all three 
possible combinations: ‘unqualified versus NGCMOs’; ‘unqualified versus GCMOs’ and 
‘NGCMOs versus GCMOs’, the null hypothesis that the specified categories are 
indistinguishable with respect to the variables in the model is rejected (P-value <0.01). This 
result would support the choice of a multinomial logistic model over the traditional bivariate 
approach. Although correlation coefficients shown in table 3 did not suggest serious 
multicollinearity, we calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) to rule out its negative potential 
effects on the results. As expected, VIF (not reported) are rather low (the average value is 
1.31 with a maximum of 1.71 for variable LEVERAGE), thus supporting our initial view that 
multicollinearity would not affect our results.  
To make it easier the interpretation of results, in table 5 we show relative risk ratios 
(RRR) in addition to coefficients of the estimation and z-values. The RRR of a coefficient 
indicates how the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group (GCMOs or NGCMOs) 
compared to the risk of the outcome falling in the referent group (unqualified reports) 
changes with each variable. We are primarily concerned with the sign and statistical 
significance of the coefficients of TENURE. If, as hypothesis #1 states, longer auditor-client 
relationships make NGCMOs less likely, the coefficient of TENURE should be negative and 
statistically significant. As shown by table 5 for the model with NGCMOs, TENURE shows a 
negative a significant coefficient (P-value <0.01). Therefore, hypothesis #1 cannot be 
rejected. Moreover, the RRR indicates that one more year of tenure would decrease the 
relative risk of NGCMOs regarding an unqualified report by a factor of 0.94, given the other 
variables in the model are held constant. However, as regards hypothesis #2 stating that the 
likelihood of GCMOs does not depend on tenure, it cannot be rejected. Taken together, these 
results suggest that external auditors could be willing to sacrifice independence in lengthy 
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engagements, but only regarding the issuance of NGCMOs. Hence, following our discussion in 
section 4, the results for GCMOs could be explained by the particularly high litigation risk 
associated to this type of opinions. Moreover, this result had been anticipated by the 
univariate analysis showing differences in median tenures which were significant for firms 
with NGCMOs (P-value <0.01) but only marginally significant for firms with GCMOs. Our 
main result that NGCMOs are less likely in longer tenures is not fully comparable to prior 
research, as this is the first attempt to address the tenure-auditor’s opinion relationship by 
differentiating between GCMOs and NGCMOs. However, the scarce research carried out with 
all types of qualifications (of which NGCMOs generally represent about 90%) can provide 
some ground for the comparability of results. In this line, the negative effect of tenure on 
NGCMOs would support Vanstraelen’s (2000) findings for the Belgian market. On the other 
hand, evidence reported about the lack of a negative effect of tenure on the likelihood of 
GCMOs would be in line with most previous research, and particularly with prior results for 
Spain (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004 and 2006) and with the available evidence for the Belgian 
low litigation risk audit market (Vanstraelen, 2002 and Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007).  
Results regarding control variables would indicate that, with no exception, whenever 
a significant effect is reported it has the predicted direction. PBANK shows significant effects 
on GCMOs and NGCMOs (P-value <0.01), in both cases with a positive sign. Focusing on 
RRR, as expected, the importance of the solvency of the firm is higher for GCMOs than for 
NGCMOs. SIZE shows a negative effect on both types of qualifications, though only 
significant for NGCMOs (P-value <0.01). Hence the likelihood of NGCMOs would be lower for 
larger firms, while the issuance of GCMOs would not depend on the size of the client. As we 
discussed in the fourth section, SIZE could have contrary effects on the likelihood of audit 
qualifications. On the one hand, because larger companies involve higher litigation risk for 
the audit firm and, on the other hand, because larger clients would have more negotiating 
power to avoid audit qualifications. Our results suggest that auditors could be willing to 
impair independence with large and, presumably, more rewarding clients, regarding 
NGCMOs, though they would not do it about GCMOs, as the latter would involve particularly 
high litigation risk (e.g., Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Francis, 2004). However, an 
alternative explanation could be that the likelihood of NGCMOs is lower for larger companies 
because they present higher accounting quality, as shown by the negative and significant 
correlation between SIZE and DISACC in table 3. Interestingly, accounting quality, proxied 
through DISACC, shows a significant effect on GCMOs and NGCMOs (P-value <0.01), 
indicating that, as predicted, the likelihood of qualified reports is lower with higher 
accounting quality. Audit qualifications are less likely for those firms with stronger cash 
positions, although results regarding GCMOs are only marginally significant. The reporting of 
losses the previous year would make NGCMOs more likely without significantly affecting the 
issuance of GCMOs. This result is rather surprising, as we had predicted a stronger effect on 
GCMOs than on NGCMOs. A possible explanation could be that, given the relatively low 
number of GCMOs in the sample, the effect of losses on GCMOs is already incorporated in the 
variable PBANK, which shows a highly significant effect on GCMOs. Being audited by a Big 4 
auditor makes NGCMOs more likely but it does not affect the issuance of GCMOs. This result 
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suggests that non-Big 4 auditors would be more willing to impair independence regarding the 
issuance of NGCMOs but they would not do it regarding GCMOs, as the latter would involve 
particularly high levels of litigation risk. Also as expected, GCMOs are more likely during 
economic downturns (P-value <0.05). However, the effect of CRISIS on NGCMO, although 
positive, is non-significant. We do not report significant effects of AGE, LEVERAGE, 
CHLEVERAGE and STOCKS on either GCMOs or NGCMOs. The comparison of tables 4 and 5 
reveals that while the multivariate analysis strongly supports the preliminary univariate 
analysis regarding NGCMOs, this is not the case for GCMOs. The differences between 
univariate and multivariate analyses for GCMOs would be due, to a great extent, to the low 
number of audit reports with GCMOs in our sample.  
We check the robustness of results to a different measure of audit tenure. 
Accordingly, we define the dichotomous variable LONGTENURE coded 1 when tenure is ten 
years or more and zero otherwise. We chose 10 years as the cutoff point because nine years 
is the median tenure in our sample. Afterwards, we re-estimate (1) with LONGTENURE 
instead of the original variable TENURE. Results (not reported) remain largely unchanged. 
The new variable LONGTENURE shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient in 
the model with NGCMOs (P-value <0.01), while in the model with GCMOs its coefficient is 
non-significant. Moreover, coefficients of control variables, in all cases show the same signs 
and levels of significance as those reported in table 5. There is some evidence (Levinthal and 
Fichman, 1988; Vanstraelen, 2000) that auditors would be more willing to issue unqualified 
reports during the first two years of engagement (during the so-called ‘honeymoon’ period). 
To test this effect, we re-estimate (1) after including the new variable HONEYMOON, a 
dichotomous variable with score 1 for the first and second year of the audit contract and 0 
otherwise. Under a honeymoon effect, the coefficient of HONEYMOON would be negative and 
statistically significant. Results (not reported) show a negative yet non-significant effect of 
HONEYMOON on either GCMOs or NGCMOs. Thus, they do not support a honeymoon effect in 
the Spanish audit market. Finally, following Davis et al. (2009), we check the robustness of 
our findings to a potential non-monotonic effect of tenure on audit quality. The authors 
proposed that audit quality could increase in early years through a learning effect, but it 
would decrease in later years due to a bonding effect. Hence, we estimate a quadratic model 
with TENURE and the new variable TENURE2, defined as the square of TENURE. Under the 
non-monotonic effect of tenure, the coefficient of TENURE should be positive and significant 
while the coefficient of TENURE2 should be negative and significant. However, results (not 
reported) do not support a non-monotonic effect of tenure on audit quality, since the 
coefficient of TENURE2 is non-significant. 
 
5.2.1. Additional analyses 
In this section we address the hypothesis #1a that the lower likelihood of NGCAQs in 
longer tenures would not be explained by higher accounting quality achieved in lengthy 
engagements with the audit firm. This issue is of major importance, particularly from a 
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regulatory viewpoint. Following DeAngelo’s (1981) classical definition of audit quality, as the 
ability to detect misstatements is higher when the auditor has a better client’s knowledge, 
and given that this knowledge increases with tenure, the reported negative effect of tenure 
on NGCMOs could be the result of higher accounting quality achieved in lengthy 
engagements. Therefore, if the hypothesis is rejected, concerns expressed by regulators 
regarding long firm tenures would not be justified. Conversely, if the hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, the lower likelihood of audit qualifications in longer tenures would be the result of 
an impairment of auditor independence, and thus the mandatory rotation of the audit firm 
should be considered.17 To address this issue we estimate the model given by (2).  
OPINION = f (PBANK, SIZE, AGE, LEVERAGE, CHLEVERAGE, LIQUIDITY,  
STOCKS, LOSSES, AUDFIRM, CRISIS, DISACC, TENURE, DISACC*TENURE) (2) 
 
As the hypothesis #1a refers to NGCMOs, the analysis is performed through a 
bivariate logistic model. This model is similar to (1) but, the dependent variable OPINION is 
now defined as 1 if the audit report has a NGCMO and 0 otherwise. In addition, we include 
DISACC*TENURE, a tenure-accounting quality interacted variable. We perform a logistic 
estimation of (2) with robust standard errors, after removing from the sample those 
observations with GCMOs. According to hypothesis #1a, we expect a negative and significant 
coefficient for TENURE, while the coefficient of DISAC*TENURE should be non-significant. 
Results of the estimation in table 6 show that the coefficient of TENURE remains negative 
and statistically significant (P-value <0.01) as in table 5, while the new interacted variable 
DISACC*TENURE shows no significant effects on the issuance of NGCMOs. Accordingly, 
hypothesis #1a cannot be rejected and thus we conclude that the lower likelihood of 
NGCMOs in longer tenures reported in tables 5 and 6 would not be explained by a supposedly 
higher accounting quality in these engagements. Therefore, our findings support loss of 
independence in long audit engagements. As expected, results regarding control variables do 
not change compared with those reported in table 5. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
 
As usual in the literature, we have proxied accounting quality by discretionary 
accruals. However, we check the robustness of our results to other indicators of accounting 
quality, as those used in Carey and Simnett (2006). Accordingly, we perform sequential 
estimations of (2) after substituting DISACC by CURACC (total current accruals); SMPROF 
(the reporting of small profits); and SMIPROF (the reporting of a small increase in profits).18 
In addition, we also include the subsequent restatement of financial statements (RESTAT) as 
an indicator of poor accounting quality.19 Obviously, in each of the four new estimations the 
tenure-accounting quality interacted variable is defined according to the proxy of accounting 
quality. In order of simplicity, in table 7 we only provide results regarding those variables 
related to either tenure or accounting quality. In each of the four estimations, TENURE shows 
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a negative effect on the likelihood of NGCMOs, while the coefficient of the corresponding 
tenure-accounting quality interacted variable is non-significant. Hence, hypothesis #1a 
cannot be rejected in any of the four estimations. Thus, the main conclusion would be that 
our previous finding that the lower likelihood of NGCMOs in longer tenures was not explained 
by higher accounting quality is robust to some of the most usual measures of accounting 
quality. Finally, it should also be noted that only two of the four measures of accounting 
quality, CURACC and SMIPROF, show significant effects (P-value <0.05 and <0.1, 
respectively) on the issuance of NGCMOs; in both cases with the predicted positive sign. This 
result would indicate a rather weak relationship between the issuance of NGCMOs and 
accounting quality.  
INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The main conclusion of this study is that auditor independence seems to be impaired 
in lengthy audit engagements. Thus, our results would support the concerns expressed by 
the Green Paper on Audit Policy about the negative effects of long audit firm tenures on the 
independence of external auditors. Besides, supporting the litigation risk framework, auditors 
seem to be willing to compromise independence in lengthy engagements regarding NGCMOs, 
but not regarding GCMOs which involve particularly high levels of litigation risk. These 
findings reported for the low litigation risk Spanish market, in conjunction with the available 
evidence for the high litigation risk U.S. market, mostly failing to report a negative effect of 
tenure on independence, would support litigation risk as an appropriate framework to 
address the auditor reporting decision. 
Our results might have some methodological implications for the study of the tenure-
audit qualifications relationship. Prior research has mostly addressed the issue through the 
analysis of the issuance of GCMOs to financially distressed companies. However, the same 
evidence reported to justify GCMOs as a measure of independence would also advocate the 
use of the issuance of NGCMOs to the whole population of firms. Our results strongly support 
this view since, in all cases, whenever a significant effect has been reported in the model 
with NGCMOs it is always in the predicted direction. Besides, results also show that GCMOs 
and NGCMOs need to be separately addressed, thus supporting our multinomial approach.  
We have extended Vanstraelen’s (2000) research about the effects of tenure on audit 
qualifications in the Belgian low litigation risk market. She included all types of firms and 
audit qualifications in the analysis, and concluded that tenure had a negative effect on 
independence as the likelihood of audit qualifications decreased with tenure. However, as the 
author did not control for accounting quality, the lower likelihood of audit qualifications could 
also be explained by higher accounting quality associated to longer tenures, in this case 
having nothing to do with independence. Besides, as the author did not differentiate between 
GCMOs and NGCMOs, results could be misleading. Our approach allows to overcome both 
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limitations, as the multinomial model includes all types of audit qualifications in the analysis 
but it differentiates between GCMOs and NGCMOs. Moreover, we have included up to five 
different proxies of accounting quality in the analysis, and the lower likelihood of NGCMOs in 
longer tenures persists; thus strongly supporting that the lower likelihood of NGCMOs in 
longer tenures is not explained by higher accounting quality supposedly achieved in these 
engagements.  
This study might have some interesting implications for policy makers, particularly in 
the current discussion about the necessity of mandatory audit firm rotation. Firstly, because 
unlike most previous research, focused on high litigation risk settings, we report evidence for 
a low litigation risk country; secondly, because the Spanish market, characterized by 
unusually long auditor-client relationships, provides an ideal context to address the effects of 
long audit tenures on independence; and thirdly, because there is no previous investigation 
on the effects of tenure on audit qualifications carried out under mandatory partner rotation. 
Regarding the latter issue, in order to limit the negative effects of long audit firm tenures on 
independence many countries have established the mandatory rotation of the lead audit 
partner. Therefore, all the available evidence on the effects of tenure on independence which 
has been obtained under voluntary partner rotation would need to be reexamined under this 
new regulatory context. Although our findings would support a mandatory rotation rule at a 
firm level in order to strengthen the value of audit reports for external users, the negative 
potential effects of such a rule, for example on the costs of audits, would require a more 
careful analysis. 
The most important limitation of this research is due to the uncommonness of 
GCMOs in our sample. Since our conclusions regarding GCMOs are based on a too low 
number of qualified reports, they should be carefully taken.  
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NOTES 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Although most countries only require the rotation of the lead audit partner, Italy, Brazil and South 
Korea have enforced a mandatory rotation rule for the audit company. In Austria, Canada and Spain, a 
mandatory company rotation rule was enforced, but subsequently abandoned. 
2
 (…) in the critical area of fair value reporting of financial instruments, instead of skeptically testing the 
reasonableness of managements’ assumptions and resulting assertions, one firm’s method involved 
obtaining valuations from a number of external parties and picking the one that is, ‘closest to the pin’ – 
the pin being management’s claimed value (Doty, 2012). 
3
 This shortcoming was explicitly pointed out by Hopwood et al. (1994) by stressing the importance of 
carrying out research on the auditor's reporting decision in contexts different than the Anglo-American. 
4
 This point was clearly posed by Menon and Williams (2010: 2): ‘‘Auditors have expertise in assurance 
audits, not in judging the going concern status of a firm, and their assessment may not add to what 
investors already know.’’ 
5
 The particularly high levels of litigation risk associated to GCMOs are clearly posed by Francis (2004): 
(…) and for this reason false negatives (clean reports) for bankrupt companies can create potentially 
significant litigation risk for auditors. In similar terms, Carcello and Palmrose (1994: 2) stated: It is 
widely assumed that unmodified (unqualified) reports before client bankruptcy lead to litigation against 
auditors. (….). On the other hand, it is assumed that modified reports prior to bankruptcy protect 
auditors from litigation. According to the authors, auditors not issuing a going concern report before 
bankruptcy are sued twice as often (64 versus 36%), have lower lawsuit dismissal rates and higher 
resolution payments (around $10 million versus $1 million). 
6
 Companies above a certain size (those fulfilling at least two of the three following conditions during two 
consecutive years: sales above 5.7 million €; total assets: 2.85 million €; workforce: 50 employees) and 
also those contracting with the public sector were obliged to audit their annual accounts. 
7
 Since the 1988 audit law imposed the mandatory rotation of the audit firm after nine years, being 1988 
the first year to be subject to the mandatory rotation rule, 1997 would have been the first year in which 
the mandatory rotation would have been applied.  
8
 Some examples of quantified qualifications would be: inadequate depreciation; understatement of bad 
debt expenses; non recognition of severance payments; overstatement of the long-term investments; 
and inaccurate estimation of the taxes payable. 
9
 Although Vanstraelen (2000) included all types of audit qualifications and not only NGCMOs, as 
NGCMOs generally represent about 90% of audit qualifications, her findings are 90% based on NGCMOs.  
10
 When the audit report contains both types of audit qualifications, due to the particularly serious 
implications of GCMO, it has been coded 2. 
11
 While Vanstraelen (2000) investigated the effects of tenure on audit qualifications, the remainder 
articles have addressed different issues regarding the issuance of audit qualifications. 
12
 Discretionary accruals would be the difference between realized working capital and an expected level 
of working capital needed to support a current sales level, where an historic relation of working capital to 
sales captures expected working capital. 
13
 Besides, in the specific case of NGCMOs, it could also be argued that as larger companies are expected 
to show higher accounting quality (see, for instance, Myers et al., 2003), the likelihood of NGCMOs 
should also be lower. 
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14 In addition, similarly to note #13 regarding the effect of SIZE on NGCMOs, well established companies 
would be expected to show higher levels of accounting quality, thus making NGCMOs less likely. 
15
 The average audit firm tenure is 5.7 years in Chi and Huang (2005); 3.6 years in Knechel and 
Vanstraelen (2007); 8.6 years in Gul et al. (2007); 6.9 years in Chen et al. (2008); and 6.9 years in Lim 
and Tan (2010). 
16 Although firms with GCMOs show a shorter median tenure than firms with NGCMOs, the statistical 
significance for this group is achieved only at marginal levels. This apparent contradiction is explained by 
the small number of observations with GCMOs. 
17 However, the potential benefits of establishing a mandatory audit firm rotation rule should be balanced 
with the increase in the costs for the audit sector and for the whole economy of such a rule. 
18 These three variables are defined as in Carey and Simnett (2006). CURACC is the change in current 
assets (excluding cash) minus change in current liabilities (excluding change in short-term notes and 
current portion of long-term debt. SMPROF is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when profit is less than 2 
percent of total assets, and 0 otherwise. SMIPROF is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when the increase 
in profit (decrease in loss) over last year’s profit/loss is less than 2 percent of total assets, and 0 
otherwise.  
19
 In the estimation performed with restatements, as the independent variable RESTAT is included in the 
model one year ahead we lose observations regarding 2009. 
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Table 1. Classification of audit reports by year and auditor opinion 
 
Auditor 
Opinion  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Unqualified 80% 85% 84% 87% 90% 90% 82% 84% 
NGCMOs 20% 15% 16% 12% 9% 8% 13% 11% 
GCMOs 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 5% 5% 
Number of 
reports 
80 82 83 82 82 82 81 80 
 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable MEAN MEDIAN ST. DEV. MAXIMUM MINIMUM 
PBANK -1.73 -1.51 2.90 12.08 -67.55 
SIZE 6.73 6.47 1.92 11.6 0.10 
AGE 1.18 1.23 0.18 1.38 0.00 
LEVERAGE 0.63 0.66 0.20 2.52 0.00 
CHLEVERAGE 0.01 0.01 0.13 1.18 -1.86 
LIQUIDITY 0.16 0.08 0.22 2.99 0.00 
STOCKS 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.97 0.00 
LOSSES 0.12 0.00 0.32 1.00 0.00 
AUDFIRM 0.92 1.00 0.28 1.00 0.00 
CRISIS 0.25 0.00 0.43 1.00 0.00 
DISACC 0.12 0.04 1.00 24.02 0.00 
TENURE 9.73 9.00 5.88 23 1.00 
 
 
PBANK is probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijewski (1984) score, with 
the weights proposed by Carcello et al. (1995); 
SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s total assets in book values at the end of the year;  
AGE is natural log of the number of years a company has been listed by in the Spanish stock 
market; 
LEVERAGE is the firm’s level of financial leverage calculated as total debt divided by total 
assets, both in book values, at the end of the year. 
CHLEVERAGE is change in LEVEVERAGE during the year; 
LIQUIDITY is calculated as the sum of the firm’s cash positions divided between current 
liabilities; 
STOCKS are computed as the firm’s inventories divided by total assets at the end of the 
year, both in book values; 
LOSSES is a binary variable with score 1 if the company’s net profit in year t-1 is negative 
and 0 otherwise;  
AUDFIRM is a binary variable with score 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 
0 otherwise; 
CRISIS is a binary variable with score 1 for years 2002, 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. 
The year 2002 corresponds to the dotcom crisis and 2008 and 2009 to the beginning of the 
financial crisis; 
DISACC is a measure of discretionary accruals, in absolute values, as defined by DeFond and 
Park (2001) and later used by Carey and Simnett (2006); 
TENURE is the number of consecutive years the company has been audited by the same 
firm. 
 
 
  
   
Table 4. Median values of independent variables according to auditor opinion. (For 
the dummy variables LOSSES, AUDFIRM and CRISIS mean values instead of 
medians are provided). 
 
Variable UNQUALIFIED NGCMOs GCMOs 
PBANK -1.52 -1.27*** 0.25*** 
SIZE 6.64 5.43*** 6.92 
AGE 1.23 1.23 1.31** 
LEVERAGE 0.66 0.66 0.84** 
CHLEVERAGE 0.01 -0.03 0.67** 
LIQUIDITY 0.09 0.03*** 0.05 
STOCKS 0.11 0.13 0.16 
LOSSES 0.08 0.32*** 0.33** 
AUDFIRM 0.92 0.92 0.75** 
CRISIS 0.24 0.23 0.67*** 
DISACC 0.03 0.07*** 0.05* 
TENURE  10.00 6.00*** 4.00* 
 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels, respectively. 
 
Significance tests:  
Mann-Whitney test of differences of medians for variables: PBANK, SIZE, AGE, LEVERAGE, CHLEVERAGE, 
LIQUIDITY, STOCKS DISACC and TENURE.  
Pearson’s chi-square test for the dichotomous variables: LOSSES, AUDFIRM and CRISIS. 
  
Table 5. Results from the multinomial logistic estimation of (1) with robust standard 
errors. Firms with unqualified reports are the comparison group. 
 
 NGCMOs GCMOs 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
Relative Risk 
Ratio 
(z-value) 
Sig. 
Level 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
Relative Risk 
Ratio 
(z-value) 
Sig. 
Level 
PBANK + 
0.57 
1.76 
(3.79) 
*** 
+ 
0.84 
2.31 
(4.68) 
*** 
SIZE - 
-0.64 
0.53 
(-5.31) 
*** 
- 
-0.72 
0.93 
(-0.30) 
 
AGE - 
-0.96 
0.38 
(-1.18) 
 
- 
1.32 
3.75 
(0.49) 
 
LEVERAGE + 
0.03 
1.03 
(0.86) 
 
+ 
0.01 
1.01 
(0.24) 
 
CHLEVERAGE + 
-0.12 
0.89 
(-0.62) 
 
+ 
0.22 
1.24 
(1.50) 
 
LIQUIDITY - 
-4.47 
0.01 
(-3.02) 
*** 
- 
-3.36 
0.03 
(-1.58) 
* 
STOCKS + 
-1.49 
0.23 
(-1.45) 
 
no significant  
-0.31 
0.73 
(-0.23) 
 
LOSSES + 
0.72 
2.05 
(2.04) 
** 
+ 
0.39 
1.47 
(0.45) 
 
AUDFIRM + 
1.28 
3.60 
(2.80) 
*** 
+ 
-0.12 
1.13 
(-0.18) 
 
CRISIS + 
0.32 
1.38 
(0.94) 
 
+ 
1.23 
3.43 
(1.99) 
** 
DISACC + 
2.65 
1.42 
(3.22) 
*** 
+ 
2.66 
1.43 
(3.21) 
*** 
TENURE - (H1) 
-0.65 
0.94 
(-2.69) 
*** 
no significant 
(H2) 
-0.04 
0.96 
(-0.56) 
 
Constant 
 5.03 
(3.55) 
***  -4.14 
(-0.86) 
 
N 
Pseudo R
2
 
Wald Chi (2) 
 
652 
0.25 
150.22*** 
 
*, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels, respectively. 
  
Table 6. Results from the estimation of (2). (Dependent variable coded 1 for 
NGCMOs and 0 for unqualified reports. Observations with GCMOs are removed from 
the sample).  
 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
(z-value) 
Sig. 
Level 
PBANK + 
0.45 
(2.94) 
*** 
SIZE - 
-0.59 
(-3.90) 
*** 
AGE - 
-0.82 
(-0.97) 
 
LEVERAGE + 
0.06 
(1.39) 
 
CHLEVERAGE + 
-0.09 
(-0.39) 
 
LIQUIDITY - 
-4.39 
(-3.01) 
*** 
STOCKS + 
-1.65 
(-1.55) 
 
LOSSES + 
0.77 
(2.15) 
** 
AUDFIRM + 
1.31 
(2.84) 
*** 
CRISIS + 
0.37 
(1.08) 
 
DISACC + 
2.85 
(3.15) 
*** 
TENURE - 
-0.07 
(-2.71) 
*** 
DISACC*TENURE 
no 
significant 
(H1a) 
-0.00 
(-0.98) 
 
Constant 
 4.42 
(2.83) 
*** 
 
N 
Pseudo R
2
 
Wald Chi (2) 
 
 
631 
0.24 
96.89*** 
*, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels, respectively. 
Table 7. Results from the estimation of (2) with alternative proxies for accounting 
quality. (Dependent variable coded 1 for NGCMOs and 0 for unqualified reports. 
Observations with GCMOs are removed from the sample). Information about 
control variables is omitted. 
 
 CURACC SMPROF SMIPROF RESTAT 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
(z-value) 
Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient 
(z-value) 
Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient 
(z-value) 
Sig. 
Level 
Coefficient 
(z-value) 
Sig. 
Level 
CURACC + 
3.27 
(2.10) 
**       
SMPROF + 
  0.23 
(0.40) 
     
SMIPROF + 
    1.23 
(1.75) 
*   
RESTAT + 
      -0.10 
(-0.18) 
 
TENURE - 
-0.06 
(-2.48) 
** -0.06 
(-2.36) 
** -0.07 
(-2.50) 
** -0.07 
(-2.38) 
** 
CURACC*TENURE 
no 
significant 
(H1a) 
-0.00 
(-0.49) 
       
SMPROF*TENURE 
no 
significant 
(H1a) 
  -0.02 
(-0.24) 
     
SMIPROF*TENURE 
no 
significant 
(H1a) 
    -0.00 
(-0.10) 
   
RESTAT*TENURE 
no 
significant 
(H1a) 
      0.00 
(0.05) 
 
 
N 
Pseudo R
2
 
Wald Chi (2) 
Level of significance 
 
 
631 
0.24 
96.89 
*** 
 
631 
0.23 
90.07 
*** 
 
631 
0.23 
90.25 
*** 
 
565 
0.23 
87.66 
*** 
  
*, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels, respectively. 
CURACC is the change in current assets (excluding cash) minus change in current liabilities (excluding change in 
short-term notes and current portion of long-term debt; SMPROF is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when profit is 
less than two percent of total assets, and 0 otherwise; SMIPROF is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when the 
increase in profit (decrease in loss) over last year’s profit/loss is less than two percent of total assets, and 0 
otherwise; RESTAT is a dichotomous variable coded 1 it the company restates accounts the next year and 0 
otherwise.  
 
